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Abstract
We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a match-
ing is computed and students have option to either finalize their matches or participate
to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mech-
anism can submit a new preference list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual
matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity
among participants, like scheduling constraints or withdrawals. We identify the con-
ditions under which such systems first produce incentives to participate to additional
runs of the matching mechanism and second yield to stable matchings (with a stability
concept adapted to this environment). We use our results to evaluate the former French
college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates
up to two months ahead the final date.
Keywords: two-sided matching, gradual matching, stability, early admission, multi-
period matching, school choice problem, withdrawal, French college admissions system.
∗We thank Laura Doval, Lucien Frys, Fuhito Kojima, Juan Sebastia´n Pereyra, Olivier Tercieux, Xavier
Venel, Alex Westkamp, Bumin Yenmez, and seminar and conference participants at Paris School of Eco-
nomics, Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Universite´ Paris 2 Panthe´on-Assas, CSEF - Universita` Fed-
erico II, Ottawa Theory Workshop, EWGE in Glasgow, SING in Odense, SAET in Faro and Pittsburgh–
Carnegie Mellon. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the support of ANR grant Dynamite-13BSH1-0010.
†Baruch College.
‡Normandie Universite´, UNIROUEN, CREAM.
1
1. Introduction
In the matching literature the standard design for a mechanism consists of first asking
participants to submit a preference list over potential matches and then run an algorithm to
compute a matching. It is then assumed that the matching is implemented, thereby implicitly
ending the mechanism. In contrast, real-life matching mechanisms are not always exactly
akin to one-shot games; participants are often offered the option to participate again to the
mechanism, possibly by submitting a new preference list. There are often obvious reasons to
do so. For instance, in school choice or college admission systems it is indeed typical to see
some students ending up unmatched and some schools not filling their capacities. Students
may also sometimes participate in several, distinct matching markets (e.g., for private and
public schools), and since students eventually attend only one school overlapping matching
markets often entail in having wasted seats. Allowing for additional runs of a matching
mechanism may give students the opportunity to improve their matches and can also help
mitigating the waste. In all such cases the “final” matching is not constructed at once but
gradually, across several runs or periods. That is, participants may not get all their final
match in the same run. Some may be matched in the first run while others are matched at
later runs. The objective of this paper is to offer a new framework to study such gradual
matching mechanisms in the context of a many-to-one college admission problem.
The general structure of a gradual matching mechanism is a multi-period matching mech-
anism where,
(i) at each period there is a one-shot matching mechanism;
(ii) at the end of each non-terminal period each participant can either finalize his match
or continue by participating in the next period’s matching mechanism;
(iii) there is a unique matching that is implemented, where each participant’s match is
given by his last match (i.e., his match when he finalized or the last period match
otherwise).
Our description of a multi-period matching mechanism deliberately mixes centralized
and decentralized aspects. The calculation of the matching at each stage is centralized
(it is done by the clearinghouse using the submitted preference lists), but the decisions to
continue or finalize one’s match are decentralized. There are a number of real-life instances
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of gradual matching mechanisms. A prominent case is the two-round New York City school
choice system for middle and high schools that was in place until 2019, where both rounds
consisted of running a standard school matching mechanism (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.,
2005). Students who were unassigned at the end of the first round, as well as students who
were unhappy about their first-round assignment were offered the opportunity to participate
again to the school choice mechanism in a second round. Students participating to the second
round could put in their preference list any school that had available seats, independently
of whether they included those schools in their first round preference list.1
Another example, which we analyze in more details in this paper, is the college admission
mechanism used in France until 2017.2 This mechanism was matching students in three
rounds and was similar in spirit to the two-round mechanism used in New York City. That
is, at the end of the first and second rounds students had to decide whether to finalize their
match or participate to an additional run of a “static” matching mechanism. Interestingly,
for the second and third rounds students in France could only consider schools that were in
their preference list in the previous round. Students were allowed, however, to modify the
relative ranking of those schools in their submitted preference lists. Some of the motives
for allowing preference updating were because students’ preferences over colleges may be
affected by factors such as where their friends have been admitted at previous runs, the
evolution of housing opportunities or simply additional information about colleges or career
prospects.3 The New York and French cases are not the only examples. For instance,
Andersson et al. (2018) comment extensively on the Swedish and Turkish systems, which
also proposed students to participate to an additional run of a matching mechanism.
In this paper we focus our attention on the benefit of participating to additional runs
of the matching mechanism, a paramount issue for gradual matching mechanisms. Indeed,
without any guarantee to be at least as well off participants have little incentives to be part
of an additional run of the matching mechanism, thereby undermining the motive to run
a gradual matching mechanism. Like Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018), this is the main question
1The seats that were available for the second round are those that were either unfilled in the first round
or made available by the students who were assigned to them but who opted for participating to the second
round.
2In 2018 college admissions in France became a decentralized system.
3Antler (2015) analyzes the structure of equilibria in presence of endogenous preferences in the context
of a standard one-to-one matching model where participants can be influenced by the assignments and/or
preferences of others.
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we address in this paper but in a model that differs from theirs in an important aspect.
Following the French college admission example, a key assumption we make in this paper
is that, at each period, students are allowed to submit a new, different preference list.
However, we impose that the new preference list does not make acceptable a college that
was previously declared unacceptable.4 Preference updating is modeled through a class a
refitting rules, which describes for each student the set of permitted preference lists that can
be submitted at every period. In the case of Dog˘an and Yenmez’s model this rule amounts
to the identity mapping, i.e., as if, from period 2 onwards, students can only submit the
same preference list they submitted at the first period. In that setting, they identify the
profiles of priorities and capacities of colleges such that the additional period of matching
benefits the students at equilibrium.5 Instead, we want to study the interplay between the
benefits of additional rounds and the degree of freedom left to students as they update
their preferences through the refitting rules. We say that a gradual matching mechanism
is gradually improving if, at any period, a participant’s match is preferred to the match of
the previous period. Since preference lists evolve across periods the preference relation we
use to compare two consecutive matches is the most recent period’s preference list. Another
criterion could be to use the older preference list, but we show that under a mild condition,
together with the same conditions that guarantee a gradual mechanism to be gradually
improving this alternative criterion is also satisfied. Note that each version of the definition
reduces to the standard notion of Pareto improvement as studied by Dogan and Yenmez
when there is no refitting across periods.
To state our results, we maintain throughout the paper the assumption that the one-shot
matching mechanism used at every period is stable. That is, the mechanism always produces
an assignment satisfying the individual rationality, no blocking pair and non-wastefulness
conditions. The assumption is strengthened afterward by considering the two most prominent
stable mechanisms, namely the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism (SOSM) and the College-
Optimal Stable mechanism (COSM). For instance, SOSM and COSM, obtained via Deferred
Acceptance algorithms, are executed at every period of the NYC school choice system and
of the French college admission system, respectively.
Under that stability assumption, we identify the refitting rules that ensure that a gradual
4Note that this restriction was not satisfied for the New York City school choice system.
5Hence Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018) address this question by considering student’s strategic decisions about
preference revelation and whether finalizing their matches or participating to an additional run.
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matching mechanism is always gradually improving. To do so we define a regularity condition,
which roughly states that if at some period a student declared some college c less preferred
than his match at that period, say, v, then he cannot declare that college c is more preferred
than v at a later period. This condition turns out to be necessary and sufficient when, at
each period, the matching mechanism is SOSM (Theorem 1). If the static mechanism is
any stable matching mechanism then the regularity condition needs to be strengthened by
requiring that any college less preferred than the match v must be declared as unacceptable at
any later period. Regarding colleges that are more preferred than the match, our regularity
conditions do not impose anything; the relative ranking of these schools can be reshuﬄed
and any of them can be declared as unacceptable.
Our results, which hold under the general setting of (strongly) regular refitting rules, can
be used to derive by-product results in the case of gradual matching mechanisms without
refitting, i.e., when students submit their preferences only once. Formally it amounts to
considering single-valued refitting rules. In that setting we show how the choice of one
specific stable mechanism, typically SOSM or COSM, may affect the benefits of participating
to additional rounds.
The notion of stability needs to be adapted to the context of gradual matching because
agents may not all be matched at the same period. So stability in our context must consider
the matchings of all periods, and since it may well be that all agents finalize their match
at the same period the traditional stability requirements must hold for each period. We
argue that stability must be also made at the inter-period level. To begin with, notice
that since gradual matching mechanisms combine centralized and decentralized features,
the properties that a concept of gradual stability imposes for a matching at some period
should be independent of what happens at later periods. This is so because the matching
calculated at each period cannot depend on participants’ decisions, i.e., whether to continue
or finalize, which are taken after the period’s match is determined. In other words, when
evaluating the matching at period, say, t, a gradual stability concept cannot consider the
matchings at periods t+1, t+2, . . . However, when considering the matching at some period
a comparison must be made with the matchings of all previous periods. The rationale for
this is best understood when considering the case of individual rationality, which becomes
a twofold condition in gradual matching problems. In static matching problems individual
rationality usually interpreted as requiring that the individual must be at least as well off as
with some “outside option,” meaning that the individual is unmatched or matched to some
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partner that is not part of problem (e.g., a private school in school choice problems). It turns
out that in gradual matching problems, at any non-initial period past matchings can also
be interpreted as additional outside options. Individual rationality in a gradual matching
problem thus require that, at each period, no agent would prefer to be unmatched, but
also that the match is preferred to the matches of all previous periods. Similarly, in static
problems the presence of blocking pairs or wasted seat being also interpreted as opportunities
for justified claims by participants, past opportunities in a context of gradual admissions
must also be taken into account. Our gradual stability concept is clearly more demanding
than the standard, static stability concept. It turns out that if the matching mechanism used
at each period is a stable matching mechanism and the refitting rule satisfies our regularity
condition then gradual stability is equivalent to gradual improvement (Theorem 2).
We also consider in the paper the case of withdrawals, that is, situations where students
may renounce to their assignments after having finalized them (but before the last period).
The presence of withdrawals that we discuss in Section 6 introduces a minor complication
because if the newly vacant seats are made available to the students for the next periods
colleges’ capacities are no longer decreasing over periods. Nevertheless, we show that our
main results are still valid in this environment.
Finally, we use our framework to examine the college admission system that was in place
until 2017, which corresponds to a three-period gradual matching mechanism.6 Students
in France were allowed to update their preference lists across periods, and for each of the
three periods the static matching mechanism used the Deferred Acceptance algorithm with
colleges proposing. It is easily shown that the refitting rule used in France satisfies our strong
regularity condition, thereby implying that it is a gradually improving and gradually stable
mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline in Section 2 the basic college
admission model we consider in the paper, which we extend in Section 3 by defining gradual
matching problems. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results identifying gradually improv-
ing mechanisms and gradual stability, respectively. We address in Section 6 the issue of
students’ withdrawals. In Section 7 we apply our results to the French system for college
admissions and we conclude in Section 8.
6By college admissions we mean the allocation of high school students to any institution of higher
education to pursue undergraduate studies, which covers many different kinds of institutions in France.
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Literature
With respect to the existing literature, gradual matching problems differ substantially from
dynamic matching problems, which generally consist of situations where participants, and
thus matching opportunities, arrive sequentially, and/or where agents may “consume” dif-
ferent matches at different periods. Dynamic problems with irreversible matches can be
found in Doval (2019), Baccara et al. (2019), Bloch and Cantala (2017) or Akbarpour et al.
(2018). Models with limited commitment, i.e., where agents can be matched multiple times
across periods are studied by Kadam and Kotowski (2018a,b), Kotowski (2019), Kennes et al.
(2014, 2019) and Pereyra (2013). In contrast, in gradual matching problems all participants
are present at the outset and, like for static matching problems, there is only one matching
that is implemented. The dynamic nature of gradual matching mechanism comes rather
from the fact that the matching mechanism is run several times to assign the participants
progressively. This class of problems has been studied in separate analytical frameworks by
Andersson et al. (2018), Manjunath and Turhan (2016), Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018), Dur and
Kesten (2018) and Westkamp (2012).7 Except for the aforementioned model of Dog˘an and
Yenmez (2018), the other contributions are not directly comparable to ours. A major dif-
ference between these works and ours is that, contrary to our modeling, subsequent periods
of matching are designed to make available new seats or positions. It can be either seats
in private schools (versus public schools in the first round) as in Andersson et al. (2018)
and Manjunath and Turhan (2016) or positions non tenured any more after the first period
as in Dur and Kesten (2018), or seats released purposely only in the second period as in
Westkamp (2012).
Participants in a gradual matching mechanism face two strategic issues: a preference
revelation decision at each period and whether to finalize or participate to the next period’s
matching mechanism. Those two issues are obviously connected; strategic choices in terms
of preference revelation may affect one’s match, which in turns affect one’s decision to par-
ticipate to an additional run of the matching mechanism. We do not address in this paper
the question of strategic behavior since Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018) already show for a two-
7Gradual matching also arises when participants can contract bilaterally before the job openings, as
identified first by Roth (1984) and documented by Roth (1991) and Kagel and Roth (2000) in different labor
markets. Halaburda (2010) and Echenique and Pereyra (2016) define general matching models to address
this issue. Avery and Levin (2010) consider decentralized admissions with early periods of admissions, used
by students to signal their interest to colleges.
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period model that is a special case of ours that participants may benefit by misrepresenting
their preferences, even if a strategyproof mechanism is used at each period. Other papers
discussing the non-existence of strategyproofness in related frameworks include the studies
of Dur and Kesten (2018) or Andersson et al. (2018). This feature is also present in the case
of multi-period matching with long-lived participants and limited commitment, as shown
by Kennes et al. (2014, 2019) and Pereyra (2013). Similar opportunities for manipulations
were already identified by Kesten (2010) when he looks at the Efficient Adjusted Deferred
Acceptance mechanism that is based on the removal of specific students during the rounds
of the static Deferred Acceptance algorithm.
2. Preliminaries
We consider in this paper the problem of matching students to colleges in the limit of their
capacities. Throughout the paper we will consider a finite set I of students and a finite set
C of colleges.
Each college c ∈ C is endowed with a fixed capacity of seats qc ≥ 0 and a strict priority
ordering Pc over the set of students. We write iPcj to say that that student i has higher
priority than student j at college c.
Each student i ∈ I has a strict preference relation Pi, also called a rank order list (ROL),
over the colleges and the option of remaining unassigned, i.e., Pi is a linear ordering over
C ∪ {∅}, with cPic′ to denote that student i prefers college c to college c′. A college c is
acceptable for a student i under the preferences Pi if i prefers to be matched to c than being
unmatched, i.e., cPi∅. We sometimes use the following notation Pi = [c1, c2, . . . , cj, ∅, . . .] to
denote that student i’s first choice is c1, his second choice c2 (i.e., c1Pic2), and so on. Given a
preference relation Pi we denote by Ri the weak relation associated to it, i.e., vRiv
′ ⇔ vPiv′
or v = v′. Here after we will often drop the subscript when referring to a preference ordering,
i.e., we will write P to denote a linear ordering over C ∪ {∅}.
A college admission problem is a 5-tuple
Γ = (I, C, (Pc, qc)c∈C , (Pi)i∈I)
We denote by P the set of all preference orderings over C ∪ {∅}. Given a ROL P ∈ P ,
we denote also by AP the acceptability set, i.e., AP := {c ∈ C : cP ∅}.
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A matching for a college admission problem (I, C, (Pc, qc)c∈C , (Pi)i∈I) is a mapping µ :
I ∪ C → 2I ∪ C such that, for each i ∈ I and each c ∈ C,
• µ(i) ∈ C ∪ {∅},
• µ(c) ∈ 2I ,
• µ(i) = c if, and only if, i ∈ µ(c),
• |µ(c)| ≤ qc.
For v ∈ C ∪ I, we call µ(v) agent v’s assignment. For i ∈ I, µ(i) = c for some c ∈ C
means that student i is matched to college c under µ, µ(i) = ∅ means then student i is not
matched to any college under µ.
Students’ preferences over colleges can be straightforwardly extended to preferences over
matchings. We say that student i prefers the matching µ to the matching µ′ if he prefers his
assignment under µ to his assignment under µ′. Formally, µPiµ′ if µ(i)Piµ′(i), and µRiµ′ if
µPiµ
′ or µ(i) = µ′(i). If µRiµ′ we say that student i weakly prefers µ to µ′.
A matching is stable if each student is matched to an acceptable college and all the
colleges he prefers to his assignment have exhausted their capacities with an assignment of
students that have higher priority. Formally, a matching µ is stable for a college admission
problem Γ if µ is a matching for Γ and
(a) it is individually rational, i.e., for all i ∈ I, µ(i)Ri∅;
(b) it is non wasteful, i.e., for all i ∈ I and all c ∈ C, cPiµ(i) implies |µ(c)| = qc;
(c) there is no justified envy,i.e., for all i, j ∈ I with µ(j) = c ∈ C, cPiµ(i) implies jPci.8
It is well known that for any college admission problem the set of stable matchings is
non-empty (Gale and Shapley, 1962). A matching mechanism θ maps college admission
problems to matchings. It is stable if for each college admission problem Γ, θ(Γ) is sta-
ble. Given a college admission problem Γ, we denote the student optimal (resp. pessimal)
stable matching by SOSM(Γ) (resp. COSM(Γ)), obtained through the implementation of
the student-proposing (resp. college-proposing) Deferred Acceptance algorithm.9 The short-
hands SOSM and COSM denote the associated mechanisms.
8Notice that the way we define stability implicity assumes that departement’s preferences over sets of
students are responsive (Roth, 1985).
9See Gale and Shapley (1962) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).
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Students
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
c2 c1 c1 c3 c1
c1 c3 c2 c4 c4
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Colleges
Pc1 Pc2 Pc3 Pc4
i1 i2 i2 i1
i2 i3 i1 i2
i3 i1 i3 i3
i4 i4 i4 i4
i5 i5 i5 i5
Table 1: A college admission problem
3. Gradual matching
3.1. An illustrative example
The next example aims at capturing some of the key aspects of a mechanism that integrates
additional periods of assignment.
Example 1 Consider a college admission problem with five students and four colleges, each
with a capacity equal to one. The preferences submitted by the students and the priorities
of the colleges are described in Table 1. We consider the matching of students during two
periods. At each period SOSM is computed according to the college admission problem at
that period.
At period 1 we obtain the matching µ1 (indicated by the square boxes in Table 1)
µ1(i1) = c1, µ
1(i2) = c3, µ
1(i3) = c2, µ
1(i4) = c4, µ
1(i5) = ∅
We now consider three possible scenarios at period 2. These scenarios illustrate the
different ways the gradual matching of students can differ from the outcome of the classic
one-period matching mechanism. For simplicity we assume that only student i2’s decisions
are subject to change.
• First scenario
Due to scheduling constraints student i2 cannot take part to the second round. She
thus accepts definitely in the first round her proposal, c3, and is removed from
the problem. In the second round the other students submit again the same ROLs and
obtain a new match given by µ2:
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µ2(i1) = c2, µ
2(i3) = c1, µ
2(i4) = c4, µ
2(i5) = ∅
Two students (i1 and i3) are strictly better off in the second round. Note that the final
matching (for the five students) is not stable since i2 has a justified envy at c1.
• Second scenario
Student i2 remains among the active students. But she submits new preferences
[c2, c1, c3, ∅] in the second round. All other things remaining equal, the students obtain
a new match, µ̂2 given by
µ̂2(i1) = c1, µ̂
2(i2) = c2, µ̂
2(i3) = ∅, µ̂2(i4) = c3, µ̂2(i5) = c4
Here, the change in the preferences is harmful for student i3 who gets no seat. In the
remainder, we will identify mechanisms that never produce such outcomes. We will
later in the paper that this requires to control precisely to which extent the students
can resubmit preferences.
• Third scenario
A good outside option for student i2 emerges at the very end of the first round. She
withdraws from her assignment c3 and she is removed from the problem.
10 Here, the
new vacant seat after the first round is put back into the pool of available seats so that
all the active students can possibly take advantage of i2’s withdrawal. All other things
remaining equal, the final matching is
µ˜2(i1) = c2, µ˜
2(i3) = c1, µ˜
2(i4) = c3, µ˜
2(i5) = c4
We account for withdrawals in Section 6.
3.2. Definitions
We consider a finite number of periods t = 1, . . . , T . A sequence of T college admission
problems Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,ΓT is nested if for each Γt = (I t, Ct, (P tc , q
t
c)c∈C , (P
t
i )i∈I), t = 1, . . . , T ,
the following properties hold:
10If the second round were a secondary scrambling session for the unmatched students, c3 should be
assigned to the student i5 who is unmatched. But since c3 is not acceptable for i5 the seat would remain
vacant under SOSM.
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• I t+1 ⊆ I t for each 1 ≤ t < T ;
• Ct = C for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T ;
• For each college c ∈ C, P tc = P 1c |It for each 2 ≤ t < T , where P 1c |It is the restriction of
P 1c to the set of students I
t. With some abuse of notation we will henceforth omit the
superscript t to refer to the priorities at period t.11
A nested sequence of college admission problems does not necessarily consist of identically
repeated college admission problems for two reasons.
First, some students may leave the problem before the final period T . We will often refer
to the students in I t for some given t as the active students (at period t). Given a sequence
(Γt)t≤T , for each student i ∈ I1, we denote by ti the latest period at which the student is
in the set of students, i.e., ti = argmax1≤t≤T{i ∈ I t}.
A second reason, and perhaps more interesting for us, is that students may have different
ROLs from one period to the other, i.e., for some t 6= t′ we may have P ti 6= P t′i for some
student i ∈ I t, I t′ . Recall that, however, that colleges’ priorities over active students are
fixed across periods.
To each nested sequence of problems (Γt)t≤T we can naturally associate a sequence of
matchings (µt)t≤T . A sequence (Γt, µt)t≤T is feasible if (Γt)t≤T is a nested sequence of college
admission problems and µt is a matching for Γt, for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T . A gradual outcome
describes the feasible sequences of problems and matchings that are mutually consistent
across periods.
Definition 1 A feasible sequence (Γt, µt)t≤T is a gradual outcome if for each 1 ≤ t < T ,
and each college c ∈ C,
qt+1c =
(
qtc −
∣∣µt(c)∣∣)+ ∣∣{i ∈ I t+1 : µt(i) = c}∣∣ . (1)
For convenience, whenever there is no confusion we will use the shorthand outcome in-
stead of gradual outcome.
Equation (1) links each problem in a sequence with the match of the previous period. For
every college, the capacity at each college consists of adding the number of seats previously
left vacant to the number of seats assigned previously to students still active at the current
11What matters is the fact that the relative priorities of students do not change accross periods.
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period. Equivalently, the seats assigned to the students who left the problem at a previous
period are deducted from the capacity the college had at the previous period.
An outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T implicitly defines a matching ν of particular interest:
ν(i) = µti(i), ∀ i ∈ I . (2)
For each student i, ν(i) describes the assignment of the student i at the time she leaves
the problem, i.e., her finalized match. Note that, by construction, ν is a matching for the
initial problem Γ1. The matching ν is called the gradual matching of (Γt, µt)t≤T .
Equations (1) and (2) capture together what makes the matching of students gradual :
some students “leave with their assignment” at a given period and, by doing so, may affect
the assignments of remaining students that can arise at later periods.
3.3. Refitting rules
The scenarios developed in Section 3.1 show that we need to impose some restrictions on
which ROLs students can submit in order to guarantee that outcomes satisfy certain prop-
erties. We do this using the concept of refitting rule, which delimits, for each period (except
for the first period) each active student’s domain of permitted ROLs. We will see that it
is sufficient to have a refitting rule depending on two parameters only: the ROL used by a
student and the match of that student, at the previous period.
Definition 2 A refitting rule is a set-valued mapping F : P × C ∪ {∅} ⇒ P .
We will use a refitting rule as follows. Let i be student i who participated at some period
t to the matching mechanism with the ROL Pi and let v be i’s match at that period. If i is
still an active student in period t + 1 then the only ROLs that can be used in that period
must belong to the set F (Pi, v). In a refitting set F (P, v) we call v the proposal.
Throughout the paper we restrict to the refitting rules that satisfy the following two
elementary properties,
(i) For every (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅}, if v ∈ AP then AP ′ 6= ∅ for some P ′ ∈ F (P, v);
(ii) For every (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅}, for every P ′ ∈ F (P, v), AP ′ ⊆ AP .
We denote by F the set of all refitting rules that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii).
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Condition (i) says that if a college is proposed to a student at some period then at least
one college is acceptable in some permitted ROL for the next period. Condition (ii) simply
states that a student cannot add a new college in his acceptable set at any permitted ROL
for the next period, i.e., the acceptability sets are nested across time. Condition (ii) is
not satisfied for instance when additional runs are only open for colleges that haven’t filled
their capacities and the static matching mechanism is non-wasteful. This case is studied by
Andersson et al. (2018).
The possibility to resubmit a new ROL has bite only if the refitting is a set-valued
mapping, that is, when the student can choose among at least two ROLs. On the contrary,
if the rule is single-valued then the outcome are fully determined by the first period’s ROLs
and players’ acceptance periods, (ti)i∈I .12
We now define two properties of refitting rules that will play a key role in our analysis.
Definition 3 The rule F ∈ F is regular if for every (P, v) ∈ P ×C ∪ {∅} and c ∈ C\{v},
vPc ⇒ vP ′c if c ∈ AP ′ , ∀ P ′ ∈ F (P, v) . (3)
A regular refitting rule imposes that any college c ranked below the proposal v must
still be ranked below the proposal in the next period if whenever in the next period college
c is acceptable. A simple regular single-valued rule is the identity mapping: for every
(P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅},
F (P, v) = {P}
Another example is the following regular set-valued refitting rule: for every (P, v) ∈ P ×C ∪
{∅},
F (P, v) =
{
P ′ ∈ P : AP ′ ⊆ AP ; v ∈ AP ⇒ v ∈ AP ′ ;∀c, c′ ∈ AP ′ , cPc′ ⇒ cP ′c′
}
.
That is, the student maintains every acceptable proposal in the next ROL and is allowed
to remove other colleges, without changing the relative ranking among acceptable colleges.
Definition 4 The rule F ∈ F is strongly regular if for every (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅} and
c ∈ C\{v}
vPc ⇒ ∅P ′c, ∀ P ′ ∈ F (P, v) . (4)
12We analyze single-valued reffiting rules in Section 4.3.
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Strong regularity requires that any college ranked below the current period assignment
is unacceptable in the permitted ROLs. A simple strongly regular single-valued rule is the
truncation mapping below the proposal where, for instance, if Pi = [c1, c2, v, . . . , ck, ∅, . . .]
then F (Pi, v) = {[c1, c2, v, ∅, . . .]}. Note that the identity mapping is not a strongly regular
rule.
3.4. Gradual matching mechanisms
We define in this section gradual matching mechanisms. Roughly speaking, such mechanisms
work as follows. We start with a college admission problem where each student participates
to a matching mechanism by submitting a ROL. Once the matching is announced students
decide whether to leave with their match or to participate in another matching mechanism.
Students’ decisions together with their new ROLs chosen according to F define the next
college admission problem. Repeating the procedure for T − 1 periods yields a gradual
outcome as defined in Section 3.2. Our main objective is to study the mechanisms that
produce gradual outcomes.
To distinguish between multi-period mechanisms and the (more traditional) matching
mechanism that matches students at each period we will refer to this latter as a spot
mechanism, i.e., a mechanism for a standalone college admission problem.
In an outcome the ROLs submitted by a student i consist of a list (P 1i , P
2
i , . . . , P
ti
i ).
We use boldface letters to describe sequence of submitted ROLs, Pi = (P
t
i )1≤t≤ti and
PJ = (Pi)i∈J ∀J ⊆ I. Note that sequence of submitted ROLs also encapsulate students’
acceptance/rejection decisions.
Besides the spot mechanism and the refitting rule, the initial problem Γ1 and the sequence
of submitted ROLs PI thus contain all the relevant information that is needed to construct
outcomes.
A gradual matching mechanism maps college admission problems and sequences of
submitted ROLs to outcomes. A generic gradual matching mechanism is denoted by MθF ,
where θ is the spot college admission mechanism and F is the refitting rule. For each problem
Γ = (I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1), MθF (Γ) is the outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T such that
(i) µt = θ(Γt) for each period t = 1, . . . , T ;
(ii) P ti ∈ F (P t−1i , µt−1(i)) for all i ∈ I t, for each period t = 2, . . . , T .
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Remark 1 Our description of a multi-period college admission mechanism deliberately
mixes centralized and decentralized aspects. The calculation of the matching at each stage
is centralized (it is done by the clearinghouse using the submitted ROLs), but the ac-
cept/decline decisions are decentralized and strategic and determine the next centralized
stages. A fully centralized version would require students to also submit schedules of ROLs
and accept/decline decisions for each period (possibly conditional on the matching obtained
at a given period).
4. Gradually improving mechanisms
We restrict our attention to the class gradual matching mechanisms for which the spot
mechanism is assumed to be stable, as it is often the case in practice or advocated in the
matching literature.
Example 1 (scenario 2) already shows that gradual matching mechanisms do not always
guarantee that participating in an additional round cannot make the students worse off.
The next concept, which formalizes this idea, is key to this paper and captures, for any
student and any given period at which a student is active (except the first one), a “no
regret” condition: the student (weakly) prefers, with respect to the current period’s ROL,
his match in that period to his match of the previous period.
Definition 5 An outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T is gradually improving if, for each 2 ≤ t ≤ T and
i ∈ I t,
µt Rti µ
t−1 (5)
Let θ and F ∈ F be respectively a spot mechanism and a refitting rule. The gradual
matching mechanism MθF is gradually improving if, for every Γ = (I1, C, (Pc, q1c )c∈C ,PI1),
the outcome MθF (Γ) is gradually improving.
Remark 2 An alternative approach would be to have a forward looking approach. In this
case the comparison of two consecutive matchings is made using the older ROL: for each
2 ≤ t ≤ T and i ∈ I t,
µt Rt−1i µ
t−1 (6)
Considering condition (5) instead of condition (6) turns out to be without difficulty. We
indeed show in the Appendix that, under a mild condition, Eq. (5) implies Eq. (6).
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Assuming that the spot mechanism is stable, a classic trick to guarantee gradual im-
provement consists of modifying, at each period t, each college’s c ∈ C priority ranking by
moving to the top qtc position all the active students who were matched to c at the period
t − 1.13 In this section we identify classes of refitting rules that guarantee the existence of
gradually improving mechanisms without needing to use this trick, which can be particularly
appealing for situations where college’s or schools’ priority rankings cannot or should not be
modified throughout the execution of the matching mechanism.
4.1. The case of stable spot mechanisms
We consider first the case where the spot mechanism is any stable mechanism (i.e., not
necessarily SOSM or COSM).
Proposition 1 Let θ be a stable spot mechanism. If F ∈ F is strongly regular then MθF is
gradually improving.
Proof Consider the problem Γ = (I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1). Let (Γ
t, µt)t≤T be the outcome
ofMθF for that problem. Suppose by way of contradiction that µt−1(i)P ti µt(i) for some t > 1
and i ∈ I t. Since θ is a stable spot mechanism, it holds that µt is stable for the problem Γt at
every period. From the individual rationality of µt for Γt we have µt(i)Rti∅, hence µt−1(i) is
necessarily a college. Let c be that college. From the non-wastefulness of µt for Γt, cP ti µ
t(i)
implies that |µt(c)| = qtc.
From Equation (1), qtc ≥ |{i ∈ I t µt−1(i) = c}|. Hence the number of students assigned
to c at period t is greater or equal to the number of seats of the college c assigned at period
t − 1 to students still active at period t. Since µt(i) 6= µt−1(i) = c, there exists a student
j ∈ I t \ {i} such that µt(j) = c and µt−1(j) 6= c.
From the no justified envy condition, it holds that jPc i since cP
t
i µ
t(i). If µt−1(j)P t−1j c
then ∅P tj c under the strong regularity of F , but this contradicts that µt is individually
rational for Γt. Since µt−1(j) 6= c, it follows necessarily that cP t−1j µt−1(j). But µt−1(i) = c
and jPci imply together that µ
t−1 does not satisfy the no justified envy condition for Γt−1,
a contradiction. 
The next result extends Proposition 1 by showing that strong regularity is also necessary
13That modified matching mechanism is sometimes used in matching problems with tenured positions,
see Combe et al. (2018) and Pereyra (2013).
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to get gradual improvement under an additional mild restriction on the domain of refitting
rules. Roughly speaking, this restriction says that every acceptable college in a permitted
ROL can also be submitted as the only acceptable college.14
Definition 6 The rule F ∈ F is rich if, for every (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅} and P ′ ∈ F (P, v),
c ∈ AP ′ ⇒ [c, ∅, . . .] ∈ F (P, v).
Proposition 2 Let θ be a stable spot mechanism and F ∈ F be a rich refitting rule. If MθF
is gradually improving then F is necessarily strongly regular.
Proof Suppose by way of contradiction that F is not strongly regular. It is sufficient to
consider the case of two students and two colleges, so let I1 = {i, j} and C = {c, c′}. So
there exists (P, c) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅} such that cPc′ and c′P ′∅ with P ′ ∈ F (P, c). We observe
first that c 6= ∅ by using the condition (ii) of a refitting rule F ∈ F since c′ ∈ AP ′ implies
c′ ∈ AP , and thus cPc′ implies that c ∈ AP .
Let Γ1 be the college admission problem such that P 1i = P , P
1
j = [c
′, ∅, . . .], Pc = Pc′ =
[i, j]. It follows that µ1(i) = c and µ1(j) = c′ from the stability of the spot mechanism θ.
Assume that students i and j are still active in period 2. Under the richness assumption,
student i can submit [c′, ∅, . . .] since P ′ ∈ F (P 1i , c) and c′P ′∅. The student j submits neces-
sarily [c′, ∅, . . .] = P 1j ∈ F (P 1j , c′), by applying the conditions (i) and (ii) of a refitting rule
F ∈ F . Then we have µ2(j) = ∅ since µ2 is stable for Γ2. But µ1P 2j µ2 contradicts that MθF
is gradually improving. 
Interestingly, it is an easy matter to check that our results are not affected if we consider
a broader family of gradual matching mechanisms where distinct stable spot mechanisms
are chosen across time.
4.2. The case of SOSM and COSM
Until now we have only required the spot mechanism to be any stable mechanism. The next
example illustrates how the choice of a specific stable spot mechanism may have incidence
on whether the gradual improvement property holds. We start with an example.
14Such a restriction discards single-valued refitting rules like the truncation mapping.
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Example 2 There are three colleges and three students. The capacity of each college is
equal to one. There are two periods. The initial college admission problem is described in
Table 2.
P 1i1 P
1
i2
P 1i3 Pc1 Pc2 Pc3
c1 c2 c3 i2 i1 i1
c3 c1 i1 i2 i3
c2 i3 i3 i2
Table 2: A college admission problem
In period 1 each student i submits the preference profile P 1i . For that profile, there is
a unique stable matching µ1 indicated by the squared boxes: µ1(i1) = c1, µ
1(i2) = c2 and
µ1(i3) = c3. Suppose that i1 and i2 decline their respective proposals while i3 accepts c3.
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In period 2 students i1 and i2 submit again P
1
i1
and P 1i2 , respectively.
16 If θ = COSM , the
resulting matching µ2 for the two remaining active students is: µ2(i1) = c2 and µ
2(i2) = c1.
Since the seat at c3 is already assigned to i3, q
2
c3
= 0. Clearly the outcome is not gradually
improving. On the contrary, if θ = SOSM then we observe that the assignments of two
remaining students are unchanged. Thus the outcome is gradually improving.
With a regular refitting rule (but not strongly regular) gradual improvement fails in
Example 2 when the spot mechanism in period 2 is the COSM. By considering instead
SOSM at every period, the example suggests that one may relax the required restrictions on
the refitting rule. Our main result, that we state now, precisely addresses this case.
Theorem 1 Let F ∈ F be a refitting rule. Then MSOSMF is gradually improving if, and
only if, F is regular.
Proof (If part) Let (I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1) be the input of MSOSMF and consider the
resulting outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T . Let 1 < t ≤ T . For each college c, define the sets Uc and Vc
15The fact that i1 and i2 decline their top choices in the first period makes the example simple. Actually,
it is an easy matter to embed the same example in a larger market (with more students and colleges) such
that the proposals c1 and c2 are not any more the top choices of i1 and i2, respectively.
16Note that in this case strong regularity is violated due to the absence of truncation below period 1’s
proposals.
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as follows:
Uc = {i ∈ I t : µt(i) = c and µt−1(i)P ti c} , (7)
Vc = {i ∈ I t : µt−1(i) = c and cP ti µt(i)} . (8)
Claim |Uc| = |Vc|, ∀c ∈ C.
Proof of the claim We first show that |Uc| ≥ |Vc| for each c ∈ C. To this end, suppose by
way of contradiction that for some college c we have |Vc| > |Uc|. So Vc 6= ∅, and thus there
exists a student j0 ∈ Vc. Note that this does not necessarily mean that j0 ∈ Uc′ for some
college c′ (if µt(j0) = ∅ then there is no such college c′).
Define the following sets,
A1 = {i ∈ I t : µt−1(i) = µt(i) = c}
A2 = {i ∈ I t : µt(i)P ti µt−1(i) = c}
From Equation (1) we know that:
qtc = |A1|+ |A2|+ |Vc|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# seats assigned at t− 1 to active stud.
+ qt−1c − |µt−1(c)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# vacant seats
(9)
Define the following set,
A3 = {i ∈ I t : c = µt(i)P ti µt−1(i)} .
Observe that µt(c) = A1∪A2∪Uc and that the three sets are mutually disjoint. It follows
that
|µt(c)| = |A1|+ |A3|+ |Uc| (10)
Since µt is stable for Γt, µt is non-wasteful. It follows thus that |µt(c)| = qtc since j0 ∈ Vc.
From Equations (9) and (10), it holds that
|A3|+ |Uc| = |A2|+ |Vc|+ qt−1c − |µt−1(c)|.
By construction, qt−1c − |µt−1(c)| ≥ 0. Hence, if |Vc| > |Uc| then we must have |A3| > 0.
Let k ∈ A3. Since µt is stable for Γt and cP tj0µt(j0), it must hold that kPcj0 (recall that
j0 ∈ Vc). Since c is a college and c ∈ AP tk , it must hold that cP t−1k µt−1(k) because F is regular.
Since µt−1(j0) = c, this implies in turn that µt−1 is not stable for Γt−1, a contradiction. So
|Uc| ≥ |Vc| for each c ∈ C.
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Since SOSM is a stable mechanism, µt is individually rational for Γt. Thus we have
µt−1(j) ∈ C for each j ∈ Uc. So j ∈ Uc implies j ∈ Vµt−1(j). Therefore, ∪cUc ⊆ ∪cVc. Since
|Uc| ≥ |Vc| for each c ∈ C, we have |Uc| = |Vc| for each c ∈ C as was to be proved. 
Suppose the conclusion of the proposition is not true at period t for the outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T .
So Uc 6= ∅ for some c. Let I˜ = ∪cUc, and let µ˜ be the matching such that
• for each i ∈ I˜, µ˜(i) = µt−1(i),
• for each i /∈ I˜, µ˜(i) = µt(i).
Note that for each c, µ˜(c) is obtained by replacing |Uc| students by |Vc| students. Since
|Vc| = |Uc|, college c is matched to |µ˜(c)| = |µt(c)| different students under µ˜. As for the
students, observe that, for each i ∈ ∪cUc, there exists only one college c′ such that i ∈ Uc′
and only one college c′′ such that i ∈ Vc′′ . So, each student i ∈ I t is matched to at most one
college under µ˜, therefore µ˜ is a matching for Γt.
We claim that µ˜ is stable for Γt. To see this, suppose that there exist (i, c) so that
cP ti µ˜(i) and j ∈ µ˜(c) such that iPcj. If µ˜(c) = µt(c), that is, µt(c) ∩ I˜ = ∅, then (i, c)
is such that cP ti µ
t(i) and µt is not stable for Γt, a contradiction. So, we can assume that
j ∈ I˜. Suppose first that i ∈ I˜. Note that µ˜(i) = µt−1(i), so the application of the regularity
assumption implies that cP t−1i µ
t−1(i). Since j ∈ I˜, we have µ˜(j) = µt−1(j). So i has
justified envy against j at period t − 1, i.e., µt−1 is not stable for Γt−1, a contradiction.
Hence i /∈ I˜. So µt(i)Rtiµt−1(i), for otherwise we would have i ∈ Vµt−1(i) and thus i ∈ I˜.
It follows that cP ti µ
t−1(i). Using again the fact that F is regular, we obtain cP t−1i µ
t−1(i).
Since µ˜(j) = µt−1(j), student i has thus a justified envy against j, which contradicts again
the stability of µt−1 for the problem Γt−1.
So at period t we obtain two stable matchings, µ˜ and µt. By construction, for each
student i ∈ I˜, µ˜P ti µt, and µt(i) = µ˜(i) if i /∈ I˜. So µt cannot be the student-optimal student
matching of Γt, a contradiction. So, Uc = ∅ for each c ∈ C, which completes the proof.
(Only if part) Let I1 = {i, j} and C = {c, c′}, with qc = qc′ = 1. Suppose by way of
contradiction that F is not regular. We show that there exists a college admission problem
and ROLs such that the resulting outcome is not gradually improving. Since F is not regular
there exist (P, v) ∈ P ×C ∪ {∅} and a college c′ ∈ AP ′ for some P ′ ∈ F (P, c) such that cPc′
and c′P ′c. We observe first that c 6= ∅ by using the condition (ii) of a refitting rule F ∈ F
since c′ ∈ AP ′ implies c′ ∈ AP , and thus cPc′ implies that c ∈ AP .
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Let Γ1 be a college admission problem such that P 1i = P , P
1
j = [c
′, ∅, . . .], Pc = [j, i],
Pc′ = [i, j]. Since cPc
′, it must be the case under SOSM that µ1(i) = c and µ2(j) = c′.
Suppose now that the students i and j decline the proposals and move on to period 2.
According to the conditions (i) and (ii) of a refitting rule F ∈ F , student j can submit
P 2j = [c
′, ∅, . . .] ∈ F (P 1j , c′). Since P ′ ∈ F (P, c), the student i can submit P 2i := P ′. Since
c′P ′c, this yields under SOSM the matching µ2 where µ2(i) = c′ and thus µ2(j) = ∅. We
then have µ1P 2j µ
2, which contradicts that MSOSMF is gradually improving. 
With respect to COSM, we deduce the following result from Propositions 1 and 2 since
that spot mechanism is stable.
Corollary 1 If F ∈ F is strongly regular then MCOSMF is gradually improving. Conversely,
let F ∈ F be a rich refitting rule then it holds that if MCOSMF is gradually improving then F
is necessarily strongly regular.
4.3. The case of gradual matching mechanisms without refitting
In this section we consider the case of single-valued refitting rules This class of rules can be
found in environments where preferences are submitted once and for all in the first period.
This implies that from the viewpoint of a student, once the ROL is submitted, the sole degree
of freedom at any period is the decision of acceptance. Note that single-valued refitting rules
do not necessarily imply that the same ROL is used at each period.
Single-valued refitting rules are of particular importance in practice. For instance, New
York City recently announced that the two-round system used for middle and high school
admissions will be replaced in 2020 by a one-round system with waiting list. Under this
new system students will be put on a waiting list for any school that is ranked above their
assignment in their submitted ROL. When seats become vacant (e.g., because of some stu-
dents’ withdrawals —see Section 6), waiting lists will be cleared using student’s preferences.
It is not too difficult to see that this system is in fact akin to a two-period gradual matching
mechanism where the refitting rule is the truncation mapping, a single-valued refitting rule.
In what follows we consider more specifically the identify mapping and the truncation
mapping, as defined in sub-Section 3.3. Recall that the identity mapping (resp. truncation
mapping) is regular (resp. strongly regular). We start with a corollary of Theorem 1 and
Proposition 1.
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Corollary 2 If F is the identity mapping (resp. truncation mapping) then MSOSMF (resp.
MCOSMF ) is gradually improving.
To go further we observe that imposing one of those two rules implies that the relative
order of acceptable colleges are unchanged in the sequences of ROLs. It allows us to make
comparisons between the gradual matching obtained and the matching that would result
from the static matching mechanism (i.e., the one obtained in the first period). It turns out
that MSOSMF and MCOSMF perform very differently on that matter.
The next result establishes that gradual improvement actually vanishes when the spot
mechanism is COSM and the refitting rule is the truncation mapping.17 For every student,
the first period assignment turns out to be the sole achievable one.
Proposition 3 Let F ∈ F be the truncation mapping. Then for every problem Γ =
(I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1),
ν = COSM(I1, C, (Pc, (q
1
c )c∈C), (P
1
i )i∈I1)
where ν is the gradual matching of MCOSMF (Γ).
Proof Consider the problem Γ = (I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1) and its outcome (Γ
t, µt)t≤T . By
assumption, for every student i and all 2 ≤ t ≤ ti, P ti is truncation of P t−1i just below the
proposal µt−1(i). To prove the proposition, it suffices to show that µt(i) = µ1(i) holds for
each t > 1 and i ∈ I t, where µ1 is the COSM of Γt. The property is obviously true for t = 1.
Consider the second period and denote by µ1I2 the matching µ
1 restricted to the set of
students I2. From the definition of an outcome, µ1I2 is a well-defined matching for Γ
2. We
claim that µ1I2 is a stable matching for the problem Γ
2. To see this, we observe that for each
i ∈ I2, µ1(i)R2i ∅ since P 2i is the truncation of P 1i below µ1(i). That is, µ1I2 is individually
rational for Γ2. Let i ∈ I2 and c ∈ C be such that cP 2i µ1(i). Hence, cP 1i µ1(i), which implies
|µ1(c)| = q1c because µ1 being a stable matching for Γ1. By construction, Γ2 is such that
q2c = q
1
c − (|µ1(c)| − |{i : ti > 1 and µ1(i) = c}|). Since µ1I2(c) = {i : ti > 1 and µ1(i) = c},
q2c = |µ1I2(c)|, i.e., the matching µ1I2 is non-wasteful. Finally, let i, j ∈ I2 with µ1(j) = c ∈ C
and suppose that cP 2i µ
1(i). Since F is the truncation mapping and µ1I2 is individually rational
for Γ2, we have cP 1i µ
1(i). Since µ1 is stable for Γ1, it holds that jPci. This implies in turn
that µ1I2 satisfies also the no justified envy condition in the problem Γ
2. So µ1I2 is a stable
matching for Γ2, which proves the claim.
17Unless some withdrawals occur, see Section 6.
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Consider µ2 (that is, COSM(Γ2)) and any student i ∈ I2. If µ1(i) ∈ C, then since P 2i
is the truncation of P 1i just below µ
1(i), there is no college c such that µ1(i)P 2i cP
2
i ∅, i.e.,
µ1(i) is the least preferred acceptable college in P 2i . Since µ
1
I2 is stable for Γ
2 and µ1(i) 6= ∅,
by the Rural Hospital Theorem (Roth, 1986) there is no stable matching µ̂ for Γ2 such that
µ̂(i) = ∅. We can conclude that µ1 is i’s least preferred match in a stable matching for
Γ2. If µ1(i) = ∅ then µ1 is also necessarily i’s least preferred match in a stable matching
for Γ2 since any stable matching is individually rational. Hence, for each student i ∈ I2,
µ2(i) = µ1(i). It follows that COSM(Γ2) = µ2 = µ1I2 (recall that COSM(Γ
2) is the pessimal
stable matching for the students in the problem Γ2). The same arguments can be used for
the subsequent periods. 
A superficial reading of Proposition 3 would lead the reader to conclude that COSM is
consistent, where consistency of a matching mechanism means that once we have removed
from the problem a subset of agents (together with their match) the match of the remaining
agents (with the same mechanism) should not change if we re-run the matching algorithm.
The type of situations considered by the consistency property is thus similar to the problem
studied here because under single-valued refitting rules a gradual matching mechanism simply
implies of running over and over again the spot mechanism where some students may be
withdrawn (together with their match) from the problem between two runs. Interpreting
thus that Proposition 3 establishes the consistency of COSM would then be at odds with the
well-known fact that the stability operator is not consistent (e.g., see Ergin, 2002). The key
difference here is the presence of the refitting rule, which implies that the ROLs of students
present in period 2 are not the same as the one they had in period 1.18
We now turn to SOSM and recover a result that can be found in the literature in different
environments. With an abuse of language we say that MSOSMF Pareto-dominates SOSM
if the two matching mechanisms do not always produce the same final matchings and if,
for any problem Γ1 = (I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c, (P
1
i )i∈I1) and any list of ROLs PI such that P
t
i =
P 1i and 2 ≤ t ≤ ti for every i ∈ I1, the gradual matching ν associated to the outcome
MSOSMF (I1, C, (Pc, q1c )c∈C ,PI1) is such that, for every i ∈ I1,
νR1iSOSM(Γ
1).
Though stated differently, the next result is virtually equivalent to Theorem 1 of Dog˘an
and Yenmez (2018) when they look at the (equilibrium) outcome of a two-stage enrollment
18Example 2 shows that Proposition 3 does not hold if the refitting rule is the identity mapping.
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system. Here it is obtained as a restatement of Corollary 2 by rephrasing the notion of
gradual improvement in terms of Pareto dominance.
Corollary 3 If F ∈ F is the identity mapping then MSOSMF Pareto-dominates SOSM.19
Proposition 3 shows that, without the ability to revise their ROLs, students have no
particular interest to delay their decisions under COSM since the final assignments are fully
determined in first period. This contrasts with the role of SOSM. Corollary 3 indeed shows
that, if ROLs are fixed, it might be tempting for sufficiently patient students to delay their
acceptance since by doing so they may obtain a better assignment.
5. Gradual stability
So far we have only considered the problem of dynamic incentives that students may face in
a system with gradual admissions; the question of stability was only a concern for the spot
mechanism. In this section we explore the question of gradual stability.
Before doing so it is useful to first delve into the definition of stability in a (static)
matching problem. To define individual rationality, non-wastefulness or absence of justified
envy a similar logic is used: we compare (1) the current matching with (2) another situation
(a counter factual matching, the matching of other students, etc), and this comparison is
made using students’ (current) preferences and colleges’ priorities.
In a gradual setting, since students may exit at any period, comparisons must be made
at every period and not only the last period. This is so because of the mix centralized-
decentralized nature of the gradual matching mechanism. At the end of each non-terminal
period students decide whether or not to continue, and thus the matching calculated at period
t cannot depend on student’s decision at the end of period t. In other words, the matching
at some period t must be the same whether students decide to continue to the next period
or to finalize their match. Therefore, in a gradual stability concept the “current” matching
corresponds to all past matchings until the student finalized his match. That is, we will not
check the properties that define stability only once but at each period a student is active.
As for point (2) it is useful to consider individual rationality, which takes a particular twist
in dynamic matchings context like the one considered in this paper. In the standard, static
case individual rationality is defined by comparing a matching with the empty matching,
19Example 1 (scenario 1) shows that the final matchings of SOSM andMSOSMF are not always identical.
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which is often presented as corresponding to some generally unspecified “outside option.”
This is fine for static problems that are taken in isolation: being not matched is the same as
being matched with an “outsider.” In a dynamic problem making this equivalence is a bit
dicey because matches from previous periods do represent outside options. If, at any period,
the current matching satisfies some notion of optimality, i.e., gradual stability, it must be
that each student’s match is preferred than his (past) outside options. Claims related to
wastefulness and justified envy follow the same principle, i.e., claims are formulated with
respect to every past matchings.
Our concept of gradual stability is given by the following definition.
Definition 7 An outcome (Γt, µt)t≤T is gradually stable if
(i) For each i ∈ I1, µt(i)Rti ∅, ∀ t ≤ ti;
(ii) For each i ∈ I1, µt(i)Rtiµt′(i), ∀ t′ ≤ t ≤ ti;
(iii) For each i ∈ I1 and c ∈ C, cP tµt(i) implies |µt′(c)| = qt′c , ∀ t′ ≤ t ≤ ti;
(iv) For each i, j ∈ I1, c ∈ C, µt′(j) = c and cP ti µt(i) imply jPci, ∀ t′ ≤ t ≤ ti.
Let θ and F ∈ F be respectively a spot mechanism and a refitting rule. The gradual
matching mechanism MθF is gradually stable if, for every Γ = (I1, C, (Pc, q1c )c∈C ,PI1), the
outcome MθF (Γ) = (Γt, µt)t≤T is gradually stable.
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 7 extend the individual rationality condition to
account for gradual admissions. The former corresponds to the “classic” participation con-
straint, i.e., at any period t up to period ti, student i’s match must be individually rational
with respect to student i’s ROL at t. The latter aims at capturing the fact that matchings
from previous periods constitute students’ outside option, where at any date t, a student’s
outside options are his matches at all periods before t and outside options are appraised with
the student’s ROL at period t. Conditions (iii) and (iv) correspond to the non-wastefulness
and absence of justified envy conditions, respectively.
Note that if there is only one period gradual stability is identical to the static stability
defined in Section 2. The next result establishes a direct connection between the conditions
of gradual improvement and gradual stability when the spot matching mechanism is stable.
One may argue that gradual stability is a demanding concept. It requires to check several
properties not only for each period but, each time the “current” period t is compared with
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all previous period t′ up to period t. Our second main result shows that in fact gradual
stability is equivalent to gradual improvement.
Theorem 2 Let θ be a stable spot mechanism and let F ∈ F be a regular refitting rule.
Then a gradual matching mechanism MθF is gradually stable if, and only if, it is gradually
improving.
To prove the theorem we need the following result.
Lemma 1 Let (Γt, µt)t≤T be a gradually improving outcome of MθF , where θ is a stable spot
mechanism and F is a regular refitting rule. Let i and t′ be such that, for some t′ ≤ ti,
cP t
′
i µ
t′(i). Then cP ti µ
t(i) for all t < t′.
Proof Suppose that t′ ≥ 2 (otherwise there is nothing to show). Since Mθ is gradually
improving, it holds that µt
′
(i)Rt
′
i µ
t′−1(i). Thus, cP t
′
i µ
t′(i) implies cP t
′
i µ
t′−1(i) and cP t
′
i ∅.
Since P t
′
i ∈ F (P t
′−1
i , µ
t′−1(i)) and F is regular, we must have cP t
′−1
i µ
t′−1(i). From gradual
improvement, we have µt
′−1(i)Rt
′−1
i µ
t′−2(i), which implies that cP t
′−1
i µ
t′−2(i) and cP t
′−1
i ∅.
Since P t
′−1
i ∈ F (P t
′−2
i , µ
t′−2(i)) we must have cP t
′−2
i µ
t′−2(i). Continuing this way we even-
tually obtain cP ti µ
t(i) for all t < t′. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Observe that gradual improvement follows directly from condition
(ii) in Definition 7. Hence, we only need to show that if a gradual matching mechanism is
gradually improving then it is also gradually stable.
Let MθF be gradually improving. Let (Γt, µt)t≤T be the outcome of MθF (Γ) with Γ =
(I1, C, (Pc, q
1
c )c∈C ,PI1). We show consecutively that the four conditions of Definition 7 are
satisfied by (Γt, µt)t≤T . Condition (i) in Definition 7 is immediate since θ is a stable spot
mechanism and is thus individually rational. To show condition (ii), assume by way of
contradiction that µt¯(i)P t
′
i µ
t′(i) for some t¯ < t′. By Lemma 1, µt¯(i)P ti µ
t(i) all t ≤ t′. But
this contradicts µt¯+1Rt¯+1i µ
t¯, which should hold since the mechanism is gradually improving.
To show condition (iii), let c ∈ C and i ∈ I1 be such that cP t′i µt′(i). From Lemma 1,
cP ti µ
t(i) for all t < t′. This implies that |µt(c)| = qtc for all t ≤ t′ since the spot mechanism
satisfies non wastefulness at every period t ≤ t′. Finally, we show condition (iv). Let j ∈ I1,
c ∈ C and t ≤ t′ such that µt(j) = c and cP t′i µt′(i) and suppose that iPcj. By Lemma 1, it
holds that cP ti µ
t(i), but this contradicts that the spot mechanism satisfies the no justified
envy condition at period t. 
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The next result is deduced from Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2.
Corollary 4
• If F ∈ F is strongly regular then MθF is gradually stable, for every stable spot mecha-
nism θ.
• If F ∈ F is regular then MSOSMF is gradually stable.
• If F ∈ F is strongly regular then MCOSMF is gradually stable.
Remark 3 It is straightforward to note that a gradually stable mechanism generates also
a stability property for the derived gradual matchings. More precisely, if (Γt, µt)t∈T is the
outcome of a gradually stable mechanism then the associated gradual matching ν satisfies
the following:20
(i) For each i ∈ I1, ν(i)Rtii ∅;
(ii) For each i ∈ I1, ν(i)Rtii µt(i), ∀t ≤ ti;
(iii) For each i ∈ I1 and c ∈ C, cP tiν(i) implies |µt(c)| = qtc, ∀t ≤ ti;
(iv) For each i, j ∈ I1, c ∈ C, µt(j) = c and cP tii ν(i) imply jPci, ∀t ≤ ti.
6. Withdrawals
In practice, it may happen that at a non-terminal period a student, who finalized his match
at a previous period, frees the seat at the college he has been assigned to. From the perspec-
tive of the initial problem that student ends up being unmatched. However, the seat that
was occupied becomes then available for the students who are still active. Such situations
can occur for instance when some students are involved in separate, competing matching
mechanisms and leave one of them at some period. This is the type of situation analyzed by
Manjunath and Turhan (2016), Dog˘an and Yenmez (2019) or Ekmekci and Yenmez (2018).21
20Recall that ν is a feasible matching for the problem at period 1 and that ν(i) = µti(i) for every i ∈ I.
21Manjunath and Turhan (2016) define a multiple stage assignment process to deal with the vacant seats
generated by students who withdraws from one of the systems. Their sequential mechanism shares some
similarities with our gradual matching mechanism. Dog˘an and Yenmez (2019) compare the performance
of unified and divided enrollment systems in terms of efficiency. Ekmekci and Yenmez (2018) analyze the
coexistence of multiple enrollment systems from the strategic viewpoint of the colleges.
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Withdrawals can also occur when students have to pass an exam to get access to colleges
but the gradual matching mechanism starts before the test. Withdrawals then happen when
a student is assigned to a college but fails the entry exam. This is what happens for instance
in France (see Section 7).
Remark 4 In static matching settings students’ withdrawals are usually taken into account
through a “scrambling” session, where unassigned seats and seats left vacant because of
withdrawals are usually (but not always) offered to any participant who remained unmatched
at the end of the main session. The two sessions together correspond to a gradual matching
but does not fit our model. The key differences lies in the refitting rules and the decision
to continue participating to the matching mechanism of the next period. First, students
who are assigned to a school in the main session are usually not allowed to participate to
the scrambling session. Second, students’ permitted ROLs in the scrambling session do not
depend on their main session ROLs. That is, refitting rules for those students are obviously
not regular.
Withdrawals can be easily encoded into the modeling of gradual matching mechanisms.
The general structure is unchanged except that we now allow any student i who finalized
his match at period ti, to notify a withdrawal at a later period, which we denote ti. When
this happens the student remains inactive but his seat now becomes vacant. An illustration
is provided in Example 1 (scenario 3).
Definition 8 A gradual outcome with withdrawals is given by
(
(Γt, µt)t≤T , (ti)i∈I1
)
where:
(a) for each i ∈ I, ti = 0 (no withdrawal) or ti > ti (withdrawal at period ti),
(b) the sequence (Γt, µt)t≤T is feasible,
(c) for each period 1 ≤ t < T and each college c ∈ C,
qt+1c =
(
qtc −
∣∣µt(c)∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#vacant seats
+
∣∣{i ∈ I t+1 : µt(i) = c}∣∣}︸ ︷︷ ︸
#seats previously assigned to current active students
+
∣∣{i ∈ I : ti = t+ 1 and µti(i) = c}∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
#seats left by withdrawals
(11)
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The main novelty in Definition 8 is Eq. (11). At each period, a college’s capacity is
updated by first adding the vacant seats at the previous period and the number of students
who were assigned to that college and have not yet finalized their match, and second by
adding the number of students who were previously assigned to that college (and have
finalized their matched earlier) but who just withdrew from the problem.
The sequence of submitted preferences of every student i is described by a pair P˜i =
((P ti )t≤ti , ti). Given a spot mechanism θ and a refitting rule F , the gradual matching mech-
anism is now denoted by WMθF , it maps the sequence college admission problems and
sequences of preferences to gradual outcomes with withdrawals.
The key difference between a gradual matching mechanism and a gradual matching mech-
anism with withdrawals is how colleges’ capacities evolve from one period to the next. How-
ever, our solution concepts being essentially backward looking, withdrawals do not jeopardize
our previous results. The reason is twofold. First, a student’s withdrawal makes no change
for those who have accepted earlier a proposal. Second, for the remaining students, the
withdrawal offers a new vacant seat that can be assigned if needed. Intuitively it should
benefit the students. Hence gradual improvement and gradual stability can be obtained
under identical (strong) regular conditions.
Proposition 4 Let θ be a stable spot mechanism and let F ∈ F be a strongly regular refitting
rule. Then WMθF is gradually improving and gradually stable.
Proposition 5 Let F ∈ F be a regular refitting rule. Then WMSOSMF is gradually improv-
ing and gradually stable.
The proof that WMSOSMF is gradually improving is similar to that of Theorem 1 and
is thus omitted. Similarly, the proof that WMθF is gradually improving for any strongly
regular refitting rule and stable spot mechanism is almost identical to that of Proposition
2. The unique difference in both cases relies on Equation (1). If the equation is replaced by
Equation (11), i.e., the one describing the capacities of colleges in the gradual outcomes with
withdrawals, it is an easy matter to check that all the arguments of the proofs go through.
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 gradual stability follows from a straightforward adaptation
of the proof of Theorem 2, which is also omitted.
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7. The French college admissions system
Until 2017, the French Ministry of Higher Education used a matching mechanism to assigning
students to the higher education programs, “Admission Post-Bac” (APB), that had both
centralized and decentralized parts.22,23
The APB mechanism consisted of three periods, running from early June to mid-July. At
each period students were matched to a school through a college-proposing Deferred Accep-
tance algorithm, hence COSM, and were given the option to accept or decline their match
(if any).24 Students declining their match could participate to the next period mechanism
by submitting a new ROL over colleges.
Under APB withdrawals were substantial. The main reason is that, APB’s first period
was before students knew whether they passed the qualifying exam to enroll a higher educa-
tion program (the “Bac”) and usually around 20% of the students fail that exam. Another
reason is that APB did not include all higher education programs. For instance, Universite´
Paris-Dauphine, Sciences-Po, or nursery schools were not participating to APB. Hence, a
non-negligible number of the students who participated to APB and got assigned to a pro-
gram through APB eventually withdrew after having been admitted to a program outside
APB.
Students participating to the second and third round were constrained with respect to
which new ROL they could submit. To identify precisely the properties of APB, we need first
to identify the properties of the refitting rule used by APB. The rule was in fact relatively
simple. For both the second and the third period, a new ROL was built from the ROL of the
previous period by removing any program that was ranked below the proposal. In addition
students were permitted to
(i) remove from the ROL of the previous period the proposal of the previous period;
(ii) remove from the ROL of the previous period some of programs that were ranked higher
22The mechanism was open to all students in their last year of high school. In 2017, over 800,000 French
high-school students used the platform.
23APB is no longer in place in France and is now replaced by a decentralized matching system akin to a
decentralized implementation of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (with colleges proposing).
24We focus only on the multi-period aspect of the French system. Among other aspects, we disregard the
details about the program’s priority rankings over students. They contain large indifference classes where
tie-breaking is depending among other things on the programs’ rank in students’ ROLs. See Bonkoungou
(2017) for an in-depth analysis of different tie-breaking rules (although in a static setting).
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than the proposal;
A formal description is the following.25
Definition 9 The refitting rule F is the APB rule if, for each (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅} and
P ′ ∈ F (P, v),
(i) For each c, c′ ∈ AP ′ , cP ′c′ ⇒ cPc′.
(ii) For each c such that vPc, c /∈ AP ′ .
and there is no refitting rule F ′ that satisfies (i) and (ii) such that (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅},
F (P, v) ⊂ F ′(P, v).
Hence, the APB refitting rule must satisfy a truncation property together with the fact
that the relative ordering of colleges is unchanged among the remaining acceptable colleges.
For instance, if P = [c1, c2, c3, c4, ∅, . . .] and c3 is proposed at some stage then the student can
choose among the following permitted ROLs: F (P, c3) = {[c1, ∅, . . .], [c2, ∅, . . .], [c3, ∅, . . .],
[c1, c2, ∅, . . .], [c1, c3, ∅, . . .], [c2, c3, ∅, . . .], [c1, c2, c3, ∅, . . .], [∅, . . .]}.
Clearly, the APB refitting rule is strongly regular. Applying Proposition 4, we obtain
thus the following result.
Proposition 6 The French college admissions system is gradually improving and gradually
stable.
Our result suggests possible adjustments of the French system. First, the properties of
gradual improvement and gradual stability can be achieved by using different stable spot
mechanisms. Instead of COSM, the use of SOSM also guarantees both properties. Second,
the APB refitting rule is restrictive and can be relaxed, allowing students to submit among
a larger set of ROLs without affecting the main properties of the system.
25In practice, students choose among those options at every round: YES: you accept definitely the proposal
and you are removed from the pool of candidates; YES BUT (not available in the last round): you accept
temporarily the proposal, but you wish to remain in the pool of candidates to obtain a college at least as
good as the proposal (as long as the latter remains acceptable in your preferences); NO BUT (not available
in the last round): you decline the proposal, which is removed definitely from your preference list, but you
wish to remain in the pool of candidates in the next periods, you might end up with no college; NO: you
withdraw from APB. It can be shown that those options are encapsulated into the definition of the APB
refitting rule.
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8. Conclusion
We analyze a new class of matching mechanisms. Their specificity relies on the conjunction
of at least two original aspects. First, the one-time matching system allows the students
to be matched at a chosen period of time. Second the students have the opportunity to
update their preferences at every period. Our main results identify the degree of freedom
we can leave to students to maintain incentives to participate (gradual improvement) and
fairness (gradual stability), according to the submitted preferences. Most remarkably, those
restrictions are consistent with those observed on a real-life market like the French college
admissions system that compels the students to strong regular refitting rules.
Not surprisingly, those mechanisms are not immune against the manipulation of pref-
erences. Even worse, bad incentives are more pervasive in this context and materialize
into more dimensions (strategic decision timing and preferences’ revelation across periods).
Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018) have identified this limitation even in the specific case of gradual
admissions with no refitting. Despite this issue, gradual matching mechanisms, in contrast
to one-shot mechanisms, provide an adequate framework to account for withdrawals, to of-
fer students the possibility to adjust their preferences, or to allow students to express time
preferences about the date at which they are matched.
Appendix
A spot mechanism θ is individually rational if, for every college admission problem Γ, the
matching θ(Γ) is individually rational.
Lemma 2 Let θ be an individually rational spot mechanism and F ∈ F be regular. If an
outcome (Γt, µt)t is gradually improving then, for each 2 ≤ t ≤ T and i ∈ I t,
µt−1(i) ∈ AP t ⇒ µt Rt−1i µt−1 (12)
Proof Suppose on the contrary that µt−1P t−1i µ
t with µt−1(i) ∈ AP t , it follows that
µt−1(i) 6= µt(i). Since θ is individually rational, we know that µtRti∅. If µt(i) ∈ C then, from
regularity, it must be the case that µt−1(i)P ti µ
t(i), which contradicts gradual improvement
(Equation (5)). If µt(i) = ∅, Eq. (5) implies that µt−1 /∈ AP t which is again a contradiction.

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The condition µt−1(i) ∈ AP t in Equation (12) is crucial and necessary. If it were not
satisfied, that is, if µt−1(i) is not acceptable for the ROL P t, one cannot guarantee that, at
the end of each non-final period, students are incentivized to participate to the next period’s
matching, in the sense of Eq. (6). A trivial counter-example is the situation where a student
gets a college at period t− 1 and P t = [∅, · · · ]. Such a ROL is consistent with our regularity
condition. For any individually rational spot mechanism we then have µt(i) = ∅, which
violates Eq. (6).
A natural way to guarantee the condition µt−1(i) ∈ AP t is by modifying condition (i) we
impose on refitting rules as follows.
(i′) For every (P, v) ∈ P × C ∪ {∅}, if v ∈ C then v ∈ AP ′ for every P ′ ∈ F (P, v).
Denote by F˜ be the set of all refitting rules that satisfy conditions (i′) and (ii). By using
Lemma 2 and our former results we easily obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 5 Let θ be a stable spot mechanism and F ∈ F˜ be strongly regular. Then the
mechanism MθF satisfies Equation (6).
Corollary 6 Let F ∈ F˜ be regular. Then the mechanism MSOSMF satisfies Equation (6).
Finally, consider the case of the so-called scrambling markets, where only participants
that are unmatched in the initial (main) period are allowed to participate in a second run of
the matching mechanism. In such cases only colleges with unfilled capacities are available.
Provided the spot mechanism is non-wasteful the second period match will be necessar-
ily weakly better than the first period matching. That is, such mechanisms are trivially
gradually improving. However, note that Eq. (6) is not satisfied.
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